The philosophy of positivism—also called logical positivism and logical empiricism—has for decades been the bane of science, especially the human sciences.
The concept “positivism” that I am using is broader than the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle in the1920s–1930s, which attempted, but failed, to find Immanuel Kant’s noumenal world through symbolic logic applied to sense data. Positivism (495–98), as it is still used today and derives from the work of August Comte, means the use of the so-called scientific methods of physics and chemistry to attempt to discover laws of human behavior and events.
All science, that is to say, must be quantitative, and if it is not quantitative, it is not science. The post-Kantian premises of positivists, in their attempt to defend science, are the following: the entire branch of philosophy called metaphysics is meaningless—that is, the concept cannot be “empirically verified”—and universals, facts, values, and, especially, truth are similarly unknowable and therefore meaningless. Awareness of reality is restricted to directly perceived concretes. At best, say the positivists, we can try to come up with “successive approximations” of statistical probabilities, but we will never reach “absolute” certainty or “eternal” truth, and, of course, all science must be “value-free.”
Thus, an endless parade of statistical studies to incrementally—and slowly—pretend to develop science, never achieving the status of universality because universals, well, as stated above, are metaphysically meaningless. This method, or epistemology, is gospel in the so-called social sciences today, which I prefer to call human sciences, the sciences of homo sapiens that emphasize and study the animal that possesses a volitional consciousness. The human sciences, in other words, study human nature as the being who exercises, or does not exercise, the capacity to reason.
The two fundamental special sciences of human nature are psychology and economics, that is, respectively, the science of the motivation and behavior of individual human beings, healthy or unhealthy, and the science of cooperating individuals in a social setting the aim of which is to generate and produce peace and prosperity.
Austrian economists do not agree with the positivist mantra, preferring the method of logical reasoning, the process of identifying correct concepts and integrating them into principles, then integrating principles into theories—leaving Newtonian-type algebraic equations to the physicists and chemists. Sigmund Freud essentially did the same thing in the development of psychoanalysis.
Austrian economist F. A. Hayek in his 1974 Nobel laureate address did not use the word “positivism,” but did say that scientism and the scientistic attitude of insisting on using the methods of physical science in the social sciences “quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world.” Scientism is a close synonym of positivism and is defined by Hayek as a pretense of knowledge.
Positivism over the years has been criticized, notably for its contradiction that metaphysics is meaningless—because that statement itself is a metaphysical assertion.
What positivism in particular lacks, among its many other faults, is a sound theory of universals and theory of abstraction from abstractions, which I have written about in previous posts (1, 2, 3).
According to Ayn Rand, universal concepts are formed by omitting the measurable differences of the concept’s referents—length, width, and height, for example, of several perceived, concrete objects we come to identify and label as “tables.” After identifying other similar but, in some respects, different perceived concretes—such as chairs and beds—we omit the measurements of size and focus on, but also omit, the different purposes of tables, chairs, and beds, retaining their use in a human household to form the concept “furniture,” which is an abstraction from abstractions.
When we move to broad abstractions in psychology and economics, such as depression and the business cycle, we require focused attention on the chain of abstractions from perceived concrete to broad abstraction—and back to the perceptual level. This mental effort—and it is mental effort—is precisely what is lacking in positivism because, as they say, the abstractions are “analytic,” arbitrary constructs, subjectively defined. Only “synthetic” perceived concretes can be true or false.
The mental effort in forming and correcting our abstractions from abstractions is precisely what led Ayn Rand (67–68) to say, rather pointedly:
Like a spoiled, disillusioned child, who had expected predigested capsules of automatic knowledge, a logical positivist stamps his foot at reality and cries that context, integration, mental effort and first-hand inquiry are too much to expect of him, that he rejects so demanding a method of cognition, and that he will manufacture his own “constructs” from now on.
Karl Popper (chap. 1) denied that he was a positivist though his premises are positivistic. He attempted to defend science by proposing the still widely accepted criterion of “falsifiability,” that is, the notion that a concept is valid only if it can be falsified.
Meaning precisely what? In the human sciences, the answer to this question is that concepts, or rather “constructs,” must be “operationalized” in order to test them using the experimental-statistical methods of the physical sciences. If that cannot be done, the concept cannot be falsified.
Operationalization means to make measurable. What is the measuring instrument to be used in the human sciences, where volition is the fundamental premise? Well, first of all, volition is not relevant because it cannot be “falsified” and, besides, real science does not acknowledge such “pseudoscience,” which, as Popper might say, is akin to astrology.
Therefore, following the Popperian method, such constructs as “attitude” from psychology and “utility” from economics must be measured by administering a “paper and pencil” instrument called a questionnaire to a sample of five hundred or more people. The collected data is then analyzed, perhaps using sophisticated multivariate statistics. Probability estimates and confidence intervals are calculated. Universals are never discussed or considered relevant or possible.
If a concept cannot be measured using this method, it cannot be falsified. It is therefore meaningless and invalid.
Popper states that science begins with highly informed guesses” (conjectures) and then attempts to falsify or refute them (chap. 3; my italics). Similarly, economist Milton Friedman (14) says that economic research, in the positivist-Popper tradition, begins with “wildly inaccurate” assumptions that we test and attempt to “empirically verify,” or rather “falsify.”*
The problem here is that the terms “guess” and “hypothesis” do not have the same referents. A hypothesis begins with significant evidence about what we are studying, but not enough to draw a definite conclusion. A guess has little or no evidence.
“Empirical verifiability” of the positivists and Popper’s alternative of “falsification” are not essentially different. They both constrict science—all science, not just the human sciences—to perceived concretes and the experimental-positivistic-behavioristic methodology, essentially dismissing broad abstractions and logical reasoning.**
As Rand’s theory indicates, the essence of science is measurement omission, not measurement, and the proper method of doing science is conceptualization. The criterion of what is true or false, that is, the correct identification of reality, is Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction. Whatever violates the law in the name of science should be called pseudoscience.
Which seems to be an appropriate descriptive of positivism.
* Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” Friedman, however, apparently regretted writing this essay.
** The experimental-positivistic-behavioristic terminology is psychologist Abraham Maslow’s disapproving description of positivist epistemology (xlvi).
This blog comments on business, education, philosophy, psychology, and economics, among other topics, based on my understanding of Ayn Rand’s philosophy, Ludwig von Mises’ economics, and Edith Packer's psychology. Epistemology and psychology are my special interests. Note that I assume ethical egoism and laissez-faire capitalism are morally and economically unassailable. My interest is in applying, not defending, them.
Wednesday, March 19, 2025
Positivism
Wednesday, May 03, 2023
Human Science, Social Science, or Science of Human Action? (part one of a three-part series)(Go to part two)(part three)
For over two centuries, the scientific study of human beings has been given various names, often followed by the word “science”: moral, human, humanistic, social, and cultural. Other suggested names have been the science of human action, or just the humanities.
None of these terms should be confused with academic departments in universities or the courses they teach, as these departments and courses usually represent more specific subjects of study determined by current fashion.
My goal in this post is to define and delimit the epistemological meaning of the fundamental science of homo sapiens and to differentiate it from two terms in use today: social science and praxeology, the science of human action.
To provide a broader context, here is a footnote from my book In Defense of Advertising (162n44):
It has been said that there are three fundamental sciences: physics, biology, and psychology, or physical science, life science, and human science. (Philosophy is not a separate science; it is the science of all sciences, the foundation of them all.) I agree with this three-way distinction. Another way to describe the division is: (1) the sciences of inanimate matter; (2) the sciences of the life forms that possess a vegetative function of life or, in addition, the conscious function of sensation, or, still further, the conscious function of perception; and (3) the sciences of the life form that possesses, in addition to the vegetative functions and the conscious functions of sensation and perception, a volitional, conceptual consciousness.“Note that the sciences,” I go on, “are cumulative in the sense that principles of physics and chemistry and of the vegetative actions of life are used in the life science of human medicine in such specialties as biomedical engineering, molecular medicine, and cardiology” (cf. Binswanger, 4-16).
Physical sciences study inanimate matter; the life (or biological) sciences study living organisms, and the human sciences study human beings. The aim of the human sciences is to study and develop a theory of human nature as the rational animal that possesses a volitional, conceptual consciousness, which means one that exhibits the capacity to reason, not one that reasons automatically.
The focus of human science is on the motivation and behavior, primarily, of the individual and only secondarily, of the individual in a group. This makes psychology the basic, foundational field of study of the human sciences.
The term “social science” has been around since the eighteenth century but became dominant in the twentieth. It refers to the study of human beings in society and is a close synonym of “sociology,” a word coined by the collectivist philosopher Auguste Comte and defined as the science of society.
Comte also coined the word “positivism” as a post-Kantian approach to identifying “true reality,” which Kant said we cannot know, by restricting awareness to directly perceivable concretes, all else being empirically meaningless. In subsequent elaborations positivism came to mean that metaphysics, universals, objective facts and values, and, especially, truth, are all unknowable. All we can do is mimic the physical sciences in method and produce statistical probabilities.
The emphasis on “social,” not individual, human beings, and statistics as method, because it looks at groups to come up with averages and percentages, made this so-called science of human beings collectivist at root. “Society,” in other words, became the entity of study, not the individual.
Use of the word “social,” or the prefix “socio-,” proliferated to modify many disciplines and endeavors: social psychology, social engineering, social justice, sociobiology, socioeconomics, sociology of (physical) science, and so on. Because of this collectivization of human science, I refused in In Defense of Advertising to endorse the word “social” when writing about the “social” criticisms of advertising. “It is a misnomer,” I wrote:
to refer to these charges [against advertising] as “social” criticisms, for the term “social” implies that morality is essentially a social concept. It is not. Morality defines a code of values to guide each individual in his choices and actions. Hence, the quotation marks around “social” (34n12).Individualism and the individual are primary. Sigmund Freud, who described himself as a “liberal of the old school” (classical liberal), “was fully persuaded that individual and social psychology are impossible to separate” (Gay, 338; Independent Judgment and Introspection, 50n3). Not just impossible to separate, I would add, the individual is the starting point of analysis, proceeding later to the individual’s relation to and interaction with others in a group setting. Society is an assortment of individuals who are the primary entities.
The dispute over methods, or methodenstreit, of the nineteenth century involved Carl Menger of the Austrian School of economics and Gustave Schmoller of the German Historical School. Menger advocated a distinctively Aristotelian theory of universal principles and their application to individual human action. Schmoller rejected such an “essentialist” epistemology and advocated the positivist notions of collecting large quantities of historical data, especially statistics.
This dispute emphasized among the Austrian economists that economics was a narrower subject of a broader theory of human science. Ludwig von Mises, at first, accepted “sociology” as the parent discipline, but rejected its collectivist premises and followers. He settled on praxeology—a word not coined by him—to define a science of human action. Many of his followers today continue to base the foundation of economics on praxeology.*
From the first time I read Mises, I found his epistemology of praxeology thorough and intriguing, but not quite right in the sense that it did not seem to comply precisely with my understanding of Ayn Rand’s epistemology. My conclusion today is that Mises was so much caught up in German philosophy that, though he went a long way toward rejecting many of its irrational premises, he failed to remove all of the primacy-of-consciousness notions, most notable being his acceptance and use of Kant’s words “a priori categories.” Mises’ use of these terms, however, is more Aristotelian than Kantian, but that will have to be postponed to next month’s post.
The problem with a science of human action is that it lacks a theory of human nature. As a concept it tries to account for all human behavior in what amounts to a substitute for moral or practical philosophy without addressing or accepting the metaphysics—philosophical psychology—of a volitional consciousness (cf. Rand, 117, 133-34, and Long). Mises abundantly uses such terms as choice (caused by ideas), value judgments, and purposive behavior (of determining means by which to achieve ends), but does not explicitly endorse free will, leaving that issue to science as an unanswered problem—of determining the relation between our brains and consciousness.**
Praxeology as a concept also actually ignores ethics, because the science is said to be “formal” and “value-free,” yet the production of wealth as the aim of economics is hugely beneficial, i.e., a value, to human life. Further, praxeology does not recognize or accept human psychology as the basic, foundational human science. Indeed, Mises, using a positivist premise, relegates the psychological theory of human motivation and behavior to experimental psychology, a naturalistic psychology (or physical science), as he calls it, and the applied science of psychotherapy, which he prefers to call thymology, to history.***
This reveals the crucial error of praxeology, namely that it does not have a valid theory of universals to answer the irrationalism of the past two hundred years. Mises correctly recognizes that the epistemological problems of economics lie in the forms of irrationalism he was up against. These include polylogism (the theory of many logics, especially an attack on Aristotelian logic), historicism (the theory that history is determined by forces beyond human control, meaning the human sciences can only produce time-bound statistical generalities) and positivism, all three of which still plague us today.
Kant’s transcendental idealism told us reason is impotent to know reality.
Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts, however, through her theory of abstraction as measurement omission, has given us a theory of universals grounded in reality. Conceptualization, properly understood and practiced, is what enables us to study and understand homo sapiens as the rational animal with a volitional consciousness, which enables us to study and understand human motivation and behavior as an individual and as a member of society.
Psychology, economics, political philosophy, and all of the applied human sciences follow without having to obsess continually over exact measurement or probabilities. More in next month’s post.
* The term “praxeology” was coined as early as 1882 from the Greek word praxis, meaning action or practice. See Hülsmann, Introduction to Epistemological Problems of Economics, xxii. This forty-seven page introduction is an excellent summary of Mises’ work.
** All we can know, says Mises, is that an acting person’s choices derive from “his individuality—the product of all that he has inherited at birth from his ancestors and of all that he himself has experienced up to the critical moment” of making a final choice, which sounds like determinism. Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, 58. See also Human Action, 46-47.
*** Thymology (Theory and History, chap. 12; Ultimate Foundation, chap. 2, section 8), like praxeology, was not coined by Mises. The term derives from the Greek word thumos, meaning soul or spirit, feeling or thought. Thymology is history in the sense that the psychotherapist must understand the patient’s concrete here-and-now thinking errors that are causing the unhappiness, as similarly the medical doctor must identify the specific ailment of a specific patient in order to recommend treatment. However, both psychotherapy and medicine rely on a vast store of previously learned universal concepts and principles that apply to these cases. Application is the epistemological process, an integral, deductive part of conceptualization and essential part of any applied science. Generalization is the prior, inductive component. “Thymology,” I submit, is not a necessary or helpful term, as applied psychology is the applied human science that psychotherapists practice, and basic or theoretical psychology is the inductive, conceptual science that is broad enough to include the experimental practitioners. Mises, as do I, rejects the pejorative term “literary psychology,” sometimes unjustly applied to Freud.

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