Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Professors Good and Bad—Mostly Bad

In a 2010 blog post, published in Applying Principles, pp. 52–54, I express my surprise at how much I enjoyed working in business, as opposed to being a student. In my recently republished pamphlet “How to Survive Graduate School,” I give a bleak description of the academic world, especially for anyone pursuing a PhD degree. I acknowledge that exceptions exist, of course, but not in my experience. Below is a description of many of the professors I endured as a student in both undergraduate and graduate school.
 
I write this partly because I have encountered adults who say they enjoyed their college experiences (the academic part, not the extracurricular activities), including graduate school. I have always been surprised by these confessions, often leaving me to speculate about how serious such persons were about fundamental ideas, especially those who professed to be students of Ayn Rand. But I will give them the benefit of the doubt on the assumption that they went to better schools than I and had better professors.
 
First, what is a good professor? One who lectures—a rarity in many colleges today and certainly when I was a student. See my post, also from 2010, in Applying Principles, pp. 174–75, where I defend the lecture as essential aid in summarizing and clarifying the text, adding relevant material and examples to enhance the student’s understanding. Lectures, above all, must be relevant to the course description in the college catalogue, not lengthy digressions on, say, the Vietnam War, as they typically were in my day.
 
Historians (ancient and American) in undergraduate school and statisticians in graduate school were good professors who met the criteria I just specified. (Accountants also, but I only took one accounting class.) The best professor overall was Leonard Peikoff, from whom I took two philosophy courses in 1966 at the University of Denver. (See the preface to my latest book for more on that.) Professor Peikoff had the uncanny ability of throwing off one-liners that not just clearly illustrated a difficult concept in philosophy but were also funny. Young and naïve as I was, I naturally assumed that all of my subsequent philosophy professors would be just like him!
 
Not even close.
 
I did not declare my major as philosophy until my sophomore year. I had heard that a youngish graduate assistant had taken Dr. Peikoff’s graduate seminar the previous year on Objectivism’s theory of knowledge, so I chose him as my advisor. At our first and only meeting I asked him what he thought of the theory. He said that Ayn Rand’s use of measurement was “cute.” I don’t recall his subsequent words, but “simplistic” and “not profound” were most likely. For any future advice that I may have needed, I just read the college catalogue. I never had him for a class.
 
Only one philosophy professor was what I would call “good,” though not outstanding. She had studied under Brand Blanshard at Yale and taught the history of philosophy courses.
 
As for a “rogue’s gallery” of professors of philosophy and other subjects during my undergraduate years, here they are:

A freshly minted PhD from Yale in his course on ethics made a reference to Ayn Rand as “that broad with the 48-inch bust.” Message to me: don’t think of mentioning her name in his class. I didn’t.
 
In a course on Hobbes and Rousseau, I wrote a paper arguing that Rousseau was a collectivist. Obviously, said the professor, I did not understand Rousseau. B. Not an atypical grade for me when using Ayn Rand’s name in a paper.
 
I did get an A in the course on mathematical logic, though the only thing I remember about it is that it involved a lot of p’s and q’s. This, no doubt, prompted me to spend my spring vacation reading H. W. B. Joseph’s Introduction to Logic and just as promptly was ridiculed by the Hobbes and Rousseau professor for having wasted my free time on such an ancient and outmoded text.
 
In a course on the Philosophies of Democracy, the oldish, former chair never lectured, but conducted the class more like a dormitory bull session, i.e., a seminar. He also was concerned about being “cool” in the eyes of his young students—this was the late 1960s, after all. We read the anti-capitalists Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, and James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.
 
Other subjects: The Cultural Anthropology professor, in a megasection of 160 students, spent the first ten minutes of a 50-minute class, going over his seating chart to mark down students who had not shown up. His exams were true-false questions, and not many, perhaps only ten or twenty.
 
The only thing I remember from the megasection of the Paul Samuelson Economics course is “guns or butter.” The professor kept saying we—meaning “society,” the collectivist “we”—have to decide whether we want more guns (this was the Vietnam era) or butter (consumable goods).
 
In a freshman English class, the assignment was to write an argumentative paper. So I summarized Ayn Rand’s epistemology. The professor was a freshly minted PhD from Princeton who, more than a couple of times, could not get his you-know-what out of bed in the morning to make it to his 8am class. After reading my paper, he said that it was the best paper he’d read written by a freshman—dot, dot, dot—“but I didn’t like it.” B. It apparently was not what he had in mind for argumentative writing.
 
Then there were the seminars. I took several. Dr. Peikoff, I was told, lectured in his seminar on the Objectivist epistemology. None of my professors did anything close to lecturing and I resented having to pay money to listen to other students talk. “Dormitory bull session” is an accurate description of seminars. In one philosophy seminar, the only thing I remember is that a classmate said the cockroach will be the only thing to survive a nuclear holocaust! (We did read Blanshard’s two-volume The Nature of Thought, which was well worth the read.)*

On to graduate school (Baruch College of the City University of New York): the teaching was worse: 

One professor stood up in front of class badly trying to reword the text and call it a lecture. Another on money and banking—well, I don’t remember a thing he said. After class, I would look at my notebook and find that I had nothing written down. 
 
Still another balanced his checkbook in the back of class while we were “working” in our groups, figuring out who was going to do what to piece together some kind of communal (collectivist) paper. The typist was the lucky one who did not have to do any research or reading!
 
On the second occasion when we were “working” in our groups, this same professor went home. After about a half hour, which we assumed was time enough for him to get home, the lights of New York City went out for the second time in history—the blackout of 1977, reminding me, of course, of Atlas Shrugged. The problem with this blackout is that we were in lower midtown Manhattan on the 19th floor of a building at 26th street and Park Avenue. I lived in Flushing, Queens. After getting about halfway to my apartment (walking, and hearing plate glass being broken behind me by looters), I spotted a cabbie who stopped to take me the rest of the way home. He didn’t want any money, but I paid him anyway. The character and generosity of New Yorkers usually comes out in situations like this.
 
Once in the doctoral program (beyond the MBA), the teaching continued to get worse. The finance professor put seven or eight books on the reading list, but told us not to buy any of them because he just put them there to get free copies from the publishers. (Business ethics anyone?) The course was all math based on perfect competition theory.
 
The professor of organizational behavior (formerly called industrial psychology or, sometimes, worker motivation and behavior) asserted at the beginning of class that the group is now the unit of analysis, not the individual.
 
Advanced micro- and macroeconomics classes were all math, based on perfect competition. A managerial economics class was all math and, of course, a forecasting class was all math. Foundations of Behavioral Research was all positivism, and quantitative.
 
There was a class on calculus and trigonometry required of all doctoral and MBA students. The professor was good, but he catered to the MBA students who could not remember their algebra. We never got to partial differentials.
 
There was one class that was quite good—on how to use the library! It was a zero-credit course, required of all doctoral students. Everyone tried to get out of the class, but no one ever did. The professor was a PhD in library science and gave us valuable information about the sources and functioning of libraries. The assignment was to write an annotated bibliography of a subject or author, based on the contents of the school’s library. I chose Ludwig von Mises. Quite a few of his books were in the library.
 
Then, there was the advanced consumer behavior research class that was actually a course on multivariate statistics. The professor did nothing. We all had to prepare and make presentations. When I was doing mine on canonical correlation, the professor nodded off. I was tempted to slam a textbook on the floor or a desk, but, probably wisely, chose not to. The professor’s reputation preceded my attendance in the course; I did not want to take his class, but could not avoid it. I learned next to nothing.
 
A finance professor did discuss capital budgeting in class, but also said that he was not going to discuss six or eight chapters of the text that were to be on the exam. I accumulated about twenty pages of notes on those chapters, condensed them initially to about eight or ten pages, then finally to three, which became my study notes. The process was one of essentialization, which enabled me to retain an enormous amount of material. I aced the exam. I did not appreciate the professor’s abandonment of teaching responsibility.
I chronicle more in my “How to Survive Graduate School” pamphlet, including especially my adventures with committees. The most curious one was what was called a “position paper,” the one in which a professor on the committee, said, as I write in the pamphlet, “Marxists are so badly discriminated against in this country.”
 
This professor, who received his PhD from New York University when Mises was there, made a derogatory comment about “those people who wanted to study with that von Hague fellow.” Yes, “Hague.” I think he was thinking of Hayek, but did not know that it was Mises who was at NYU, not Hayek.
 
I say “curious” about the position paper because I had already written a master’s thesis. I suspect it was put in the curriculum for doctoral students who bypass the MBA and go straight to the PhD. Someone on that committee said that my paper was not really a position paper. I had presented three schools of economic thought—neoclassical, Chicago, and Austrian—and what their theories had to say about marketing, taking my stand, or position, with the Austrians. Much of this paper ended up in my book In Defense of Advertising.
 
I think the position paper was supposed to be, in good positivist fashion, a review of a few dozen statistical studies and my concluding judgment of how the studies had “advanced” science.
 
The committee, without putting it into words, convinced me that my subsequent book on the defense of advertising would never fly as a PhD dissertation.
 
So much for my rant about professors. I don’t know if I would survive in today’s academic climate. Politicization is everywhere. Censorship, punishment, and firings for saying and writing the wrong thing are rampant.
 
It would probably drive me to seek a job as an electrician—and make upwards of $200,000 a year!
 
Why is academia so bad and unresponsive to its paying customers? I answered that question in Montessori, Dewey, and Capitalism, chapter 5, especially the section on bureaucratic education. Schools, all schools, including the universities, are bureaus of the government.
 
Hey profs—I want my money back!
 
 
* I think the model of a good seminar is that of the professional musician’s master class given to a number of students of a particular music teacher. Each student performs a short piece or study. The master then critiques and recommends solutions to problems, to improve the student’s technique and expression of the music. The Ludwig von Mises seminar at New York University, so I’ve heard and read about, began with Mises, the master, talking about some issue for about 30 minutes or so, followed by questions from the group with Mises analyzing and answering the questions. Often, a student would read a paper, followed by the master discussing what was presented. Only once was I present at a master music class (as observer, not student) and never did I experience a master teacher in a seminar.
 

Thursday, September 24, 2026

The Applicator in Academia

Not too long ago, I mentioned to my wife, only partly joking, that because my career as a professor was in the applied science of marketing I was and am an applicator. I take ideas from the more fundamental disciplines and apply them in my teaching and writing.
 
I have come to accept the term as accurate and, in retrospect, have realized that my professors in both undergraduate and graduate school were applicators also.
 
Think of the person who installs new tile on your floor or shingles on your roof. The construction applicator takes what is on the shelf at the supply shop and lays it on your floor or roof. Professors do the same thing, in all fields of learning including philosophy. They take what’s on the shelf (of the more fundamental disciplines, the supply shop), apply it to their specific fields, then teach it to their students and write about it. The “shop” includes the discipline’s current and past literature that professors often accept too uncritically.
 
Philosophy is the most fundamental of the campus disciplines, so its “shelf” is the latest philosophy books and journal articles. Professors of philosophy—nearly all professors, actually—feel compelled to fit into the mold of that current context and teach and write in the same style as what they have read.*
 
What is on the shelf today for the business disciplines of marketing and management? The doctrine of pure and perfect competition and Keynesianism in economics and behaviorism (positivism more broadly) in psychology. The professors take these two doctrines as givens and, without question, spew them forth to their students and publication audiences.
 
If Austrian economics is acknowledged to exist at all, it is dismissed and disparaged. The same for any alternative in psychology. Cognitive psychology has been corrupted by behaviorism where it is now called “cognitive behavioral psychology” and “cognitive behavioral therapy.” Research and writing is entirely conducted in the older behaviorist mold. Studies must use statistics and probabilities (because there are no universals) and the “falsifiability” criterion of Karl Popper, rather than identification of the facts of reality and the formulation and clarification of universal concepts, are the fundamental methodologies. (Freud is also smeared and ignored, with the exception of specific training programs in psychoanalysis.)
 
Needless to say, Ayn Rand is still not taught, understood, or accepted in any way today in the academic world. (There are exceptions, but not many.) I am tempted to say that there is an “Ayn Rand derangement syndrome” operating in the minds of many academics. Nothing she said or wrote, as the attitude goes, could possibly be correct, interesting, or appropriate for a college classroom.
 
Neither Ayn Rand nor Ludwig von Mises are on the academic supply shelf.
 
This was true in the 1960s and ‘70s when I was in undergraduate and graduate school, and it seems to be the same today, perhaps worse, because of what is now available, namely the postmodern version of Marxism.
 
What did I do in graduate school (and somewhat as an undergraduate)? I called it my “double duty” education. In class and the textbooks, I reluctantly absorbed what was being taught me, but at home would go over the material to figure out what was wrong and what I thought was correct. It took extra time, but it was worth the effort.
 
Because so much bad epistemology was being taught to me in class—even marketing professors were trashing advertising—I began thinking about what became my first book In Defense of Advertising. I also quickly became aware that anything like that book could not be written or submitted as a PhD dissertation. It was not a “true [positivist] study.” My dissertation, consequently, was a study on perceived risk, which is a valid concept in psychology, but the results, to use Edith Packer’s word, were minutia.
 
The problem with the “applicators” of ideas is that everything on the shelf must be questioned and examined carefully for falsehoods, especially epistemological errors, then replaced with better ideas. Which means going away from the standard academic supply shop to find those better ideas, which is seldom done by today’s professors. It means a lot of rethinking of subjects from the ground up.
 
Schools of engineering and business are better than the “social” sciences and humanities, because the professors of engineering and business still rely on objective facts to teach their students how to build bridges and rockets and how properly to run a business for a profit. Engineering is better than business, as bad economics and psychology mentioned above taints the content of business courses. The so-called social sciences and the humanities are the worst.
 
Bad epistemology is everywhere in today’s academic world and it affects content. Good applicators, to conclude this metaphor, must know and use good epistemology—specifically, Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts—to analyze, review or reject, or expand and revise what is on the academic supply shelf before applying it for purposes of teaching and writing.
 
Better or improved tiles and shingles, or a totally new and creatively different covering, are what are needed in today’s academic world. This is how and why I call myself an applicator.
 
 
* See Brand Blanshard’s short book, On Philosophical Style, for a discussion of clarity in philosophical writing. All academics could learn from it.
 

Tuesday, September 07, 2021

From the Preface to Applying Principles

Applying Principles: Short Essays Based on the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Economics of Ludwig von Mises, and Psychology of Edith Packer will be published October 1. It is my first ten years of blogging. The book may be preordered at Amazon and Barnes & Noble, with more information on its website books.jkirkpatrick.net. Here are edited selections from the preface.


Although I spent thirty-six years in college classrooms teaching undergraduate and graduate students business marketing, my bachelor’s degree was in philosophy. That subject influenced and underscored my entire career. As a result, I never let the day job of teaching students how to sell soap (as I would often describe my academic duties) become disconnected from its foundations in psychology, economics, or philosophy.

Indeed, I recognized early in graduate school that marketing, as well as the other business disciplines, are properly described as applied sciences that rest on those more fundamental fields. “Art” is sometimes used to describe applied science, but the usage is correct only if it is meant as a synonym. Often the word is meant to disparage applied fields because they are allegedly less precise or rigorous than “real” science, which means the physical or quantitative sciences. A student many years ago complimented me when she realized that advertising was as disciplined (her word) as finance, her major. There may not be universal equations in the applied human sciences, but the principles are universal in their appropriate context and the fields are “disciplined.”

Business as applied science is analogous to medicine and engineering. Medicine rests on biology for its more fundamental foundation and engineering on physics and chemistry. All fundamental and derivative special sciences, again in turn, rest on philosophy. All such fields are related and should be integrated, rather than isolated as they so often are in today’s academic world.

Thus, what I did when researching, writing, and teaching was to apply principles from the other, more fundamental fields, which explains my interest in epistemology and psychology, as well as the principles unique to marketing and advertising.

To illustrate further, the civil engineer whose goal is to build a bridge must know not just the fundamentals of physics and chemistry, but also the nature and composition of materials (used to build the bridge), and also the nature and behavior of rivers, which includes the history of the particular river over which the bridge will span and the nature and behavior of the river’s soil and water.

Applied science gathers all relevant concrete facts of the specific case it is working on, then uses, that is, applies, the universal concepts and principles of the fundamental sciences on which it rests, plus the narrower concepts and principles of its discipline.

Application is one of the two fundamental methods of cognition and is deductive. Generalization is the other and is inductive. We all use both every day in our lives. The two methods, as I say in my 2018 blog post, “are not the monopoly of scientists, philosophers, or academics in general.” Generalization gives us concepts and principles to guide our lives, while it also gives us theory and theoretical science. Application, which requires the previously acquired knowledge that generalization gives us, is what our medical doctors do, what Sherlock Holmes did, and what we do on a daily basis.

Application means we identify “a this as an instance of a that.” We present a cough and runny nose to our doctor and he or she quickly concludes, based on accumulated knowledge and patient history, that we have a cold. Similarly, Holmes saw that Watson was tanned and showed signs of having been wounded in a war; thus he concluded Watson recently came back from Afghanistan. And a child applies the previously learned concept of balance by shifting weight when learning to ride a bicycle. All three examples are processes of deduction, and illustrate how deduction is the predominant method of applied sciences, as well as everyday life.*

Deduction, therefore, is essentially what I have been doing when writing my blog posts. I am not in any intended way coming up with new concepts or principles, nor am I repeating the proofs of the great writers listed in my masthead, or others I may cite in a post as a reference. I take their ideas and apply them to specific issues.


The following essays are not journalistic as a newspaper column might be. I gave myself the assignment always to come up with something more fundamental than the news of the day, whether theoretical or historical, which last includes relevant citation of research.

The posts are organized into seven chapters, listed chronologically within chapter. Because of the way I write—“interdisciplinary” to use the academic jargon—one may quibble over some classifications. The chapters are “Capitalism and Politics,” “Academia,” “Education,” “Psychology,” “Epistemology,” “Youth Sports,” and “The Arts.”

I do have favorites. It was difficult to choose one per chapter, but here they are, in chapter order:

• “The Reductio of Bureaucracy: Totalitarian Dictatorship”

• “Because the Stakes Are So Small”

• “Go Fish!”

• “Look at Your Premises. Look. Look. Look!”

• “Why Don’t Facts Matter?”

• “Yes, There Is Crying in Softball”

• “Life in Three-Quarter Time”

My idea for publishing this collection comes from two books of columns: All It Takes Is Guts by economist Walter Williams and Double Standards by radio show host Larry Elder. I did not read these books from beginning to end. I skimmed the table of contents and read whatever caught my attention. Readers of this work might want to do the same.


* It is in this sense that history is also an applied science. We, as well as professional historians, look at past events, natural or human, and try to explain them, that is, identify their causes, by reference to our accumulated theoretical knowledge. Historians in the human sciences rely in particular on political philosophy, economics, and psychology. See Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History, amazon.com.
 

Monday, August 24, 2009

The Importance of Philosophy to a Successful Business Career

Understanding the broad abstractions of ethics and epistemology can instill confidence in one’s work life. Such understanding is especially helpful in a business career, not for the purpose of preaching to co-workers, employees, or customers, but to maintain clear thoughts about what is right and wrong in decision making and to correctly perceive facts in complicated situations.

Most ethical issues in business center on honesty. For example, a boss might say to a young worker, “Tell the customer it’s on the truck,” when in fact the order has not yet been processed. The assumption is that the company will scramble to get the order on the truck before a major delay occurs and customer dissatisfaction results. The problem with this stretching of the truth is that as days, weeks, months, and years go by it often gets stretched further and further from reality leading to “what the customers don’t know won’t hurt ‘em.” This can eventually culminate in an Enron or Bernard Madoff scenario. Such is the importance of honesty in a business career.

Telling the truth is the simplest solution to business problems even if it results in being yelled at or temporarily losing business. It is far better than living a life of fakery. The tricky part about honesty is that lying and dishonesty are not the same. Honesty does not require truth telling under threat of force. A misdirection lie to deceive a potential thief of the whereabouts of your money is quite honest and moral. Everyone has a right to self-defense. Everyone also enjoys a right to privacy—no one, for example, has a right to your financial situation. A negotiator might ask, “Tell me the truth. What is your rock bottom price?” or “Is this [specific amount] your final price?” You may properly respond evasively or with an incorrect specific price. This is not game playing or bluffing; it is sound, ethical decision-making.

Bribery is an omnipresent issue in the press and in discussions of business ethics. It also is an issue of honesty—because of the deception that occurs—but it is compounded by its similarity to a number of other concepts that it too often is not differentiated from. Epistemology, particularly the theory of definition, can help clarify this.

Most bribes involve a payment of money or offer of gift to influence others. But so does a perk, a grease payment, extortion, subornation, and a commission or broker’s fee. And then there is the gift of candy to children, often called a bribe, to get them to clean their rooms. How are these to be distinguished from each other? The rules of definition say that our concepts must be classified in terms of genus and differentia, that is, concepts must be put into a broad category first, then differentiated from the other items that are similar to the one being defined. This is the situation we have with bribery.

The genus of all the concepts in the previous paragraph is a payment or gift to influence others. The differentia of each does the clarifying. A perk is an above-board prize that accompanies one’s job, such as a tip or company car. “Above-board” means it is not covert or secretive. A grease payment is a modest incentive to induce foot-dragging bureaucrats to perform their normal duties. Extortion is a demand for payment under threat of force, whereas subornation is a covert payment to persuade someone to ignore or violate the law, rules, or one’s ethics. A commission or broker’s fee is payment for a job well done, such as a closed sale. The candy given to children? It’s just an incentive to action. To call it a bribe is metaphorical extension of the original concept.

So what is a bribe? Most similar to subornation, it is a covert payment designed to undermine a relation of trust. A sales rep, for example, offers an extra payment to a buyer, unbeknownst to the owner of the buyer’s company, in exchange for a contract. The deceit and breach of trust occurs by cheating the owner of the buyer’s company. Bribery is a precise concept that should not be slung around lightly and applied to all of these other actions. It is a specific type of unsavory behavior that, when not understood clearly, becomes applied to and confused with decent, respectable outcomes, such as perks, commissions, and parental management of children. Such is how philosophy, particularly epistemology, can parse complicated issues.

The resulting clarity inspires strength and conviction that paying a perk, commission, or maybe even making a grease payment are not unsavory behavior.

The most important place in which philosophy can instill confidence in one’s work life in business is in the understanding of self-interest as moral and in the guiltless acceptance and promotion of the profit motive of capitalism. For a wealth of resources on these issues, I refer readers to the works of Ayn Rand and Ludwig von Mises.

Sunday, April 26, 2009

The Epistemology of Ethics, Salesmanship, and Basket Weaving

In a previous post I said that teachers are peddlers of ideas who must sell their wares as much as any other sales rep or entrepreneur. The process by which soap and ideas are sold is essentially the same. The method is persuasive communication and the purveyors of both can be honest or dishonest. There is nothing unique to the theory of salesmanship that makes sales reps more prone to dishonesty than teachers, and teaching in a free market is salesmanship.

In this post I would like to make a similarly iconoclastic statement about three apparently disparate fields, namely that ethics, salesmanship, and basket weaving are all applied sciences. The first anomaly, according to many hard core philosophers and scientists, is that I would dare to call any of these fields a science. The second is that I would dare to lump them together with equal epistemological standing. Let me take these one at a time.

In its broadest sense, science studies reality—not just the physical, but also the mental—and aims to describe it accurately and provide guidelines for human choices and actions. In this sense philosophy is the science of all sciences, because it identifies the broadest abstractions about reality and provides the broadest guidelines for the rest of the special sciences. The special sciences, whether physics, engineering, medicine, or basket weaving, must be consistent with the more general sciences, but they in turn describe their own areas of reality and provide guidelines for choice and action to achieve specific goals in those realms.

To explain and predict are said today to be the two aims of science. Explanation, however, implies prediction. If a ball is described as round, for example, the description predicts that the ball will roll. This positivist view of science as explanation and prediction leaves values out completely. Values are guides to action. If a ball is to be thrown accurately to a target, then it is valuable for the hand, arm, and rest of the body to move in a certain way. A scientist of ball throwing prescribes which actions have to be made in order to achieve the goal of hitting a target. To live a healthy and moral life, scientists of nutrition and ethics also prescribe certain actions that must be taken to achieve the respective goals. There are two aims of science, but they are to explain and guide. Guidance specifies a goal and the actions necessary to reach the goal. All value theories are sciences of guidance. This applies equally to ethics, salesmanship, and basket weaving. (For doubters about basket weaving as a science, a Google search generates millions of hits and refers the searcher to an enormous literature describing the principles of basket weaving.)

Value theories are applied “how to” sciences and are just as factual as any so-called hard or descriptive physical science. Value theories describe how to get things done. Ethics describes how to live the good life, salesmanship describes how to sell products, and basket weaving how to make baskets. Nothing could be more factual than that, which makes all of these fields as scientific as physics, chemistry, or biology.

For that matter, epistemology is also a how-to discipline, since its aim is to describe how we know what we know and then, on the basis of that knowledge, to prescribe how to improve our ways of knowing. As a result, there is no difference in essential methodology used by epistemology and ethics, or ethics and salesmanship, or salesmanship and basket weaving. They all use the same approach to identifying the concepts and principles that constitute their particular subjects of study. The only relevant difference among all of these disciplines is level of abstraction. The concepts and principles of epistemology and ethics are far more abstract than those of salesmanship and basket weaving.

Putting on an air of superiority simply because one works in an area of greater abstraction smacks of what Robert Fuller would call rankism (1, 2). Science is science and applied science is applied science. As much can be learned from blue-collar workers who love their jobs and approach them with attention to subtle detail as one can learn from college professors who work in the stratosphere of theoretical concepts and principles. In many cases one can learn more from blue-collar workers than from professors, because the latter are too often caught up in their own jargon to be able to relate it to the lay person. And some professors all too often have no desire to relate their work to the lay person. But everyone today in our knowledge economy holds, or should hold, equal epistemological standing in the generation and application of knowledge.

One does not pay plumbers so much for what they do as for what they know. That makes plumbers, basket weavers, sales reps, and ethicists all fellow professionals.